Dumb Money: Mutual Fund Flows and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns by Andrea Frazzini & Owen A. Lamont
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
DUMB MONEY: MUTUAL FUND FLOWS AND









We thank Nicholas Barberis, Judith Chevalier, David Musto, Stefan Nagel, and seminar participants at
Goldman Sachs, the NBER and Yale for helpful comments.  We thank Breno Schmidt for research assistance.
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research. 
©2005 by Andrea Frazzini and Owen A. Lamont.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is
given to the source.  Dumb Money: Mutual Fund Flows and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns
Andrea Frazzini and Owen A. Lamont
NBER Working Paper No. 11526
July  2005
JEL No. G14, G23, G32
ABSTRACT
We use mutual fund flows as a measure for individual investor sentiment for different stocks, and
find that high sentiment predicts low future returns at long horizons. Fund flows are dumb money
￿ by reallocating across different mutual funds, retail investors reduce their wealth in the long run.
This dumb money effect is strongly related to the value effect. High sentiment also is associated high
corporate issuance, interpretable as companies increasing the supply of shares in response to investor
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Individual retail investors actively reallocate their money across different mutual funds.  
Individuals tend to transfer money from funds with low recent returns to funds with high recent 
returns.  In addition to looking at past returns of funds, individuals also may consider economic 
themes or investment styles in reallocating funds.  Collectively, one can measure individual 
sentiment by looking at which funds have inflows and which have outflows, and can relate this 
sentiment to different stocks by examining the holdings of mutual funds.  This paper tests 
whether sentiment affects stock prices, and specifically whether one can predict future stock 
returns using a flow-based measure of sentiment.  If sentiment pushes stock prices above 
fundamental value, high sentiment stocks should have low future returns. 
For example, using our data we calculate that in 1999 investors sent $37 billion to Janus 
funds but only $16 billion to Fidelity funds, despite the fact that Fidelity had three times the 
assets under management at the beginning of the year.  Thus in 1999 retail investors as a group 
made an active allocation decision to give greater weight to Janus funds, and in doing so they 
increased their portfolio weight in tech stocks held by Janus.  By 2001, investors had changed 
their minds about their allocations, and pulled about $12 billion out of Janus while adding $31 
billion to Fidelity. In this instance, the reallocation caused wealth destruction to mutual fund 
investors as Janus and tech stocks performed horribly after 1999. 
According to the “smart money” hypothesis of Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999), some 
fund managers have skill and some individual investors can detect that skill, and send their 
money to skilled managers.  Thus (in contrast to the Janus example) flows should be positively 
correlated with future returns.  Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) show that the short term 
performance of funds that experience inflows (in the last three months) is significantly better 
than those that experience outflows, suggesting that mutual fund investors have selection ability.   Dumb money – Page 2 
 
Our focus is on stocks, not on funds.  We are interested in how investor sentiment affects 
stocks prices, and see fund flows as a convenient (and economically important) measure of 
sentiment.  To test whether investor sentiment causes mispricing, one must test whether high 
sentiment today predicts low return in the future, and we focus on cross-sectional stock return 
predictability over periods of months and years.  We ask the question of whether, over the long-
term, investors are earning higher returns as a result of their reallocation across funds.   
For each stock, we calculate the mutual fund ownership of the stock that is due to 
reallocation decisions reflected in fund flows.  For example, in December 1999, 18% of the 
shares outstanding of Cisco were owned by the mutual fund sector (using our sample of funds), 
of which 3% was attributable to disproportionately high inflows over the previous 3 years.  That 
is, under certain assumptions, if flows had occurred proportionately to asset value (instead of 
disproportionately to funds like Janus), the level of mutual fund ownership would have been only 
15%.  This 3% difference is our measure of investor sentiment.  We then test whether this 
measure predicts differential returns on stocks. 
Our main results are as follows.  First, as suggested the example of Janus and Cisco in 
1999, on average from 1980 to 2003, retail investors direct their money to funds which invest in 
stocks that have low future returns.  To achieve high returns, it is best to do the opposite of these 
investors.   We calculate that mutual fund investors experience total returns that are significantly 
lower due to their reallocations.  Therefore, mutual fund investors are dumb in the sense that 
their reallocations reduce their wealth on average.   We call this predictability the “dumb money” 
effect.  This dumb money effect poses a challenge to rational theories of fund flows.   
Second, the dumb money effect is related to the value effect.  Money flows into mutual 
funds that own growth stocks, and flows out of mutual funds that own value stocks.  The value Dumb money – Page 3 
 
effect explains some, but not all, of the dumb money effect.  The fact that flows go into growth 
stocks poses a challenge to risk-based theories of the value effect, which would need to explain 
why one class of investors (individuals) is engaged in a complex dynamic trading strategy of 
selling “high risk” value stocks and buying “low risk” growth stocks.   
Third, demand by individuals and supply from firms are correlated.  When individuals 
indirectly buy more stock of a specific company (via mutual fund inflows), we also observe that 
company increasing the number of shares outstanding (for example, through seasoned equity 
offerings, stock-financed mergers, and other issuance mechanisms).  This pattern is consistent 
with the interpretation that individual investors are dumb, and smart firms are opportunistically 
exploiting their demand for shares. 
These results give a different perspective on the issue of individuals vs. institutions.  A 
large literature explores whether institutions have better average performance than individuals.  
In the case of mutual funds, for example, Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) show 
that stocks held by mutual funds have higher returns, and Chen, Jegadeesh,  and Wermers (2000) 
show that stocks bought by mutual funds outperform stocks sold by mutual funds.  Both results 
suggest that mutual fund managers have stock-picking skill. 
Unfortunately, since individuals ultimately control fund managers, it can be difficult to 
infer the views of fund managers by looking only at their holdings.  For example, when the 
manager of tech fund experiences large inflows, his job is to buy more technology stocks, even if 
he thinks the tech sector is overvalued.  So if we observe the mutual fund sector as a whole 
holding technology stocks, that does not imply that mutual managers as a whole believe tech 
stocks will outperform.  It is hard for a fund manager to be smarter than his clients.  Mutual fund 
holdings are driven by both managerial choices in picking stocks and retail investor choices in Dumb money – Page 4 
 
picking managers.  We provide some estimates of the relative importance of these two effects. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section I reviews the literature.  Section II discusses 
the basic measure of sentiment, describes the data, and examines the relation of corporate 
issuance and flows.  Section III looks at the relation between flows and stock returns.  Section  
IV looks at the relation between flows and mutual fund returns.  Section V uses calendar time 
portfolios to put the results in economic context, showing the magnitude of wealth destruction 
caused by flows and providing evidence on whether mutual fund managers have stock-picking 
skill.  Section VI looks at issuance by firms.  Section VII presents conclusions. 
I.  Background and literature review 
A.  Determinants of fund flows 
A series of papers have documented a strong positive relation between mutual fund past 
performance and subsequent fund inflows (see, for example, Ippolito (1992), Chevalier and 
Ellison (1997), and Sirri and Tufano (1998)).  In addition, retail investors appear to allocate their 
wealth to funds that have caught their attention through marketing (see Jain and Wu (2000), and 
Barber, Odean and Zheng (2004)), or funds with names that reflect hot investment styles 
(Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2005)).  Benartzi and Thaler (2001) report evidence that retail 
investors employ simple rule-of–thumbs in allocating across different types of mutual funds. 
For individual stocks, the picture looks different.  Odean (1999), and Barber and Odean 
(2000, 2001, 2004) present extensive evidence that individual investors suffer from biased-self 
attribution, and tend be overconfident, thus engaging in (wealth-destroying) excessive trading.  
But in contrast to their return-chasing behavior in mutual funds, a variety of evidence suggests 
that individual investors act as contrarians when trading individual stocks (see Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2000), Goetzmann and  Massa (2002)).   Dumb money – Page 5 
 
While this apparent contradiction between return-chasing and contrarianism is 
interesting, the hypothesis we wish to test does not depend on resolving this issue.  We are 
interested in testing whether individual investor sentiment predicts future returns, so our 
hypothesis is not contingent on measuring whether investors are ultimately return-chasing or not.  
If individual investor sentiment causes prices to be wrong and prices eventually revert to 
fundamental value, then sentiment should negatively predict future returns no matter what – 
whether individuals over-react or under-react, whether they return-chase or not.  As it turns out, 
in the data we study, mutual fund flows are indeed return-chasing, and flows tend to go to stocks 
that have gone up recently. 
B.  Causal effects of flows on prices 
  There is evidence that fund flows have positively contemporaneous correlations with 
stock returns (see, for example, Brown et al (2002)).  Although it is difficult to infer causality 
from correlation, one interpretation of this fact is that inflows drive up stock prices.  We do not 
attempt to test this hypothesis with our data, for three reasons.  First, we are interested in whether 
sentiment causes long-term mispricing, not the short term dynamics of precisely how trading 
affects prices.  Second, we observe flows and holdings at fairly low frequency (quarterly), so our 
data is not well suited to studying short-term price dynamics.  Third, although the fund flows we 
consider are certainly economically large, we view them as an imperfect measure of sentiment 
since individual investor sentiment can be manifested in many other ways.  While individuals 
were sending mutual fund money to tech funds in 1999, and thus indirectly purchasing tech 
stocks, they may have also been buying tech stocks directly in their brokerage accounts, or 
investing in hedge funds that bought tech stocks.  In addition, flows can understate the effects of 
sentiment on the mutual fund sector itself.  If Janus experiences inflows, then other funds Dumb money – Page 6 
 
experiencing outflows might seek to imitate Janus in order to appeal to whatever is in fashion.  
Thus flows are a way to measure sentiment, but are not the only channel for sentiment to work.  
Thus the hypothesis we wish to test is that stocks owned by funds with big inflows are 
overpriced.  These stocks could be overpriced because inflows force mutual funds to buy more 
shares and thus push stock prices higher, or they could be overpriced because overall demand 
(not just from mutual fund inflows) pushes stock prices higher.  In either case, inflows reflect the 
types of stocks with high investor demand.   
C.  Styles and sentiment 
A paper closely related to ours is Teo and Woo (2004), who also find evidence for a 
dumb money effect.  Following Barberis and Shleifer (2003), Teo and Woo (2004) consider 
categorical thinking by mutual fund investors along the dimensions of large/small or 
value/growth.  They show that when a particular category has large inflows, stocks in that 
category subsequently underperform.  Like us, they relate mutual fund flows to stock returns, but 
unlike us they look only at style returns, not individual stock returns.   
While Teo and Woo (2004) provide valuable evidence, our approach is more general.  
The benefit is that we do not have to define specific styles or categories, such as value/growth.  
While categorical thinking and style classification are undoubtedly important in determining 
fund flows, from a practical point of view it is difficult for the researcher to identify all relevant 
categories used by investors over time.   For example, the growth/value category was not widely 
used in 1980.  Instead, we impose no categorical structure on the data and just follow the flows.  
Most strikingly, we are able to document that the fund flow effect is highly related to the value 
effect, a finding that could not have been discovered using the method of Teo and Woo (2004).  
More generally, one could devise many different measures of investor sentiment based on Dumb money – Page 7 
 
prices, returns, or characteristics of stocks (see for example Baker and Wurgler (2005) and Polk 
and Sapienza (2004)).  If sentiment effects stocks prices and creates stock return predictability 
(as prices deviate from fundamentals and eventually return), as long as trading volume is not 
zero it must be that someone somewhere is buying overpriced stocks and selling underpriced 
stocks.  To prove that some class of investors overweights high sentiment stocks, it is necessary 
to prove that these investors lose money on average from trading (before trading costs).  Our 
measure of sentiment is based on the actions of one good candidate for sentiment-prone 
investors, namely individuals.  Using their trades, we infer which stocks are high sentiment and 
which stocks are low sentiment.  We show that this class of investors does indeed lose money on 
average from their mutual fund reallocations, confirming that they are the dumb money who buy 
high sentiment stocks. 
II.  Constructing the flow variable 
Previous research has focused on different ownership levels, such as mutual fund 
ownership as a fraction of shares outstanding (for example, Chen, Jegadeesh,  and Wermers, 
2000).  We want to devise a measure that is similar, but is based on flows.  Specifically, we want 
to take mutual fund ownership and decompose it into the portion due to flows and the portion not 
due to flows.  By “flows,” we mean flows from one fund to another fund (not flows in and out of 
the entire mutual fund sector).  
Our central variable is FLOW, the percent of the shares of a given stock owned by 
mutual funds that are attributable to fund flows.  This variable is defined as the actual ownership 
by mutual funds minus the ownership that would have occurred if every fund had received 
identical proportional inflows (instead of experiencing different inflows and outflows), every 
fund manager chose the same portfolio weights in different stocks as he actually did, and stock Dumb money – Page 8 
 
prices were the same as they actually were.  We define the precise formula later, but the 
following example shows the basic idea. 
Suppose at quarter 0, the entire mutual fund sector consists of two funds: a technology 
fund with $20 B in assets and a value fund with $80 B.  Suppose at quarter 1, the technology 
fund has an inflow of $11 B and has capital gains of $9 B (bringing its total assets to $40 B), 
while the value fund has an outflow of $1 B and capital gains of $1 B (so that its assets remain 
constant).  Suppose that in quarter 1 we observe the technology fund has 10% of its assets in 
Cisco, while the value fund has no shares of Cisco.  Thus in quarter 1, the mutual fund sector as 
a whole owns $4 B in Cisco.  If Cisco has $16 B in market capitalization in quarter 1, the entire 
mutual fund sector owns 25% of Cisco. 
We now construct a world where investors simply allocate flows in proportion to initial 
fund asset value.  Since in quarter 0 the total mutual fund sector has $100 B in assets and the 
total inflow is $10 B, the counterfactual assumption is that all funds get an inflow equal to 10% 
of their initial asset value. To simplify, we assume that the flows all occur at the end of the 
quarter (thus the capital gains earned by the funds are not affected by these inflows).  Thus in the 
counterfactual world the technology fund would receive (.20)*(10) = $2 B (giving it total assets 
of $31 B), while the value fund would receive (.80)*(10) = $8 B (giving it total assets of $89).  
In the counterfactual world the total investment in CISCO is given by (.1)*(31) = $3.1, which is 
19.4% of its market capitalization.  Hence, the FLOW for CISCO, the percent ownership of 
Cisco due to the non-proportional allocation of flows to mutual funds, is 25 – 19.4 = 5.6%.  
FLOW is an indicator of what types of stocks are owned by funds experiencing big 
inflows.  It is a number that can be positive, as in this example, or negative (if the stock is owned 
by funds experiencing outflows or lower-than-average inflows).  It reflects the active reallocation Dumb money – Page 9 
 
decisions by investors.  What FLOW does not measure is the amount of stock that is purchased 
with inflows; one cannot infer from this example that the technology fund necessarily used its 
inflows to buy Cisco.  To the contrary, our assumption in constructing the counterfactual is that 
mutual fund managers choose their percent allocation to different stocks in a way that is 
independent of inflows and outflows. 
Is it reasonable to assume that managers choose their portfolio weights across stocks 
without regard to inflows?  Obviously, there are many frictions (for example, taxes and 
transaction costs) that would cause mutual funds to change their stock portfolio weights in 
different stocks in response to different inflows.  Thus, we view FLOW as an imperfect measure 
of demand for stocks due to retail sentiment.   
In equilibrium, of course, a world with different flows would also be a world with 
different stock prices, so once cannot interpret the counterfactual world as an implementable 
alternative for the aggregate mutual fund sector.  Later, when we discuss the effects of flows on 
investor wealth, we consider an individual investor (who is too small to affect prices by himself) 
who behaves like the aggregate investor.  We test whether this individual representative investor 
benefits from the active reallocation decision implicit in fund flows.  For individual investors, 
refraining from active reallocation is an implementable strategy. 
A.  Flows 
We calculate mutual fund flows using the CRSP US Mutual Fund Database.  The 
universe of mutual funds we study includes all domestic equity funds that exists at any date 
between 1980 and 2003 for which quarterly net asset values (NAV) are available  and for which 
we can match CRSP data with the common stock holdings data from Thomson Financial 
(described in the next subsection).  Since we do not observe flows directly, we infer flows from Dumb money – Page 10 
 
fund return and NAV as reported by CRSP.  Let 
i
t N  be the total NAV of a fund i and let
i
t R be 
its return between quarter  1 - t and quarter t.  Following the standard practice in the literature 
(e.g. Zheng (1999), Sapp and Tiwari (2004)), we compute flows for fund i in quarter t, 
i
t F , as the 
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where MGN is the increase in total net assets due to mergers during quarter t . Note that (1) 
implicitly assumes that inflows and outflows occur at the end of the quarter, and that existing 
investors reinvest dividends and other distributions in the fund.   We assume that investors in the 
merged funds place their money in the surviving fund. Funds that are born have inflows equal to 
their initial NAV, while funds that die have outflows equal to their terminal NAV. 
  Counterfactual flows are computed under the assumption that each fund receives a pro 
rata share of the total dollar flows to the mutual fund sector between date  k t -  and date t, with 
the proportion depending on NAV as of quarter k t - . More precisely, in order to compute the 
FLOW at datet, we start by looking at the net asset value of the fund at date  k t - . Then, for 
every date s we track the evolution of the fund’s counterfactual NAV using:  
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where 
i F ˆ  and 
i N ˆ  are counterfactual flows and NAV’s. 
Agg F  is the actual aggregate flows for the 
entire mutual fund sector, while
Agg
k - t N  is the actual aggregate NAV at date  k t - .  Equations (2) 
and (3) describe the dynamics of funds that exist both in quarter  k t -  and in quarter t.  For funds Dumb money – Page 11 
 
that were newly created in the past k quarters, 
i N ˆ  is automatically zero – all new funds by 
definition represent new flows. The resulting counterfactual net asset value 
i
t N ˆ  at date t 
represents the fund size in a world with proportional flows in the last k  quarters.  
For a detailed numerical example of our counterfactual calculations, see the appendix 
(which also discusses other details on equations (2) and (3)). We obtain a quarterly time series of 
counterfactual net asset values for every fund by repeating the counterfactual exercise every 
quarter t , and storing the resulting  t
i N ˆ  at the end of each rolling window. 
Consider a representative investor who represents a tiny fraction, call it q, of the mutual 
fund sector.  Suppose that this investor behaves exactly like the aggregate of mutual investors, 
sending flows in and out of different funds at different times.  The counterfactual strategy 
described above is an alternative strategy for this investor, and is implementable using the same 
information and approximately the same amount of trading by the investor.  To implement this 
strategy, this investor only needs to know lagged fund NAV’s and aggregate flows.  For this 
investor, 
i
t N ˆ q  is his dollar holding in any particular fund.   
In designing this strategy, our aim is to create a neutral alternative to active reallocation, 
which matches the total flows to the mutual fund sector.  One could describe this strategy as a 
more passive, lower turnover, value-weighting alternative to the active reallocation strategy 
pursued by the aggregate investor.  It is similar in spirit to the techniques of Daniel, Grinblatt, 
Titman, and Wermers (1999) and Odean (1999) in that it compares the alternative of active 
trading to a more passive strategy based on lagged asset holdings.  A feature of our 
counterfactual calculations is that they do not mechanically depend on the actual performance of 
the funds.  A simpler strategy would have been to simply hold funds in proportion to their lagged 
NAV.  The problem with this strategy is that it mechanically tends to sell funds with high returns Dumb money – Page 12 
 
and buy funds with low returns.  Since we wanted to devise a strategy that reflected only flow 
decisions by investors (not return patterns in stocks), we did not used this simpler strategy. 
Let  it x  be the net asset value of fund i in month t as a percentage of total asset of the 
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The difference between it x and  it x ˆ  reflects the active decisions of investors to reallocate money 
from one manager to another over the past k quarters in a way that is not proportional to the 
NAV of the funds.  This difference reflects any deviation from value weighting by the NAV of 
the fund in marking new contributions.  In theory, this difference could reflect rebalancing away 
from high performing funds and into poorly performing funds, in order to maintain some fixed 
weights (instead of market weights).  In practice, investors tend to unbalance (not rebalance), 
sending money from poorly performing funds to high performing funds. 
B.  Holdings  
Thomson Financial provides the CDA/Spectrum mutual funds database, which includes 
all registered domestic mutual funds filing with the SEC. The data show holdings of individual 
funds collected via fund prospectuses and SEC N30D filings.  The holdings constitute almost all 
the equity holdings of the fund (see the appendix for a few small exceptions).  The holdings data 
in this study run from January 1980 to December 2003. 
While the SEC requires mutual funds to disclose their holdings on a semi-annual basis, 
approximately 60% of funds additionally report quarterly holdings.  The last day of the quarter is Dumb money – Page 13 
 
most commonly the report day.  A typical fund-quarter-stock observation would be as follows: as 
of March 30
th, 1998, Fidelity Magellan owned 20,000 shares of IBM.   The holdings data are 
notably error-ridden, with obvious typographical errors. Furthermore, some reports are missing 
from the database.
1  We use a series of filters to eliminate data errors (see appendix). 
In matching the holdings data to the CRSP mutual fund database, we utilized fund 
tickers, fund names and total net asset values.  For each fund and each quarter, we calculate  ij w  
as the portfolio weight of fund i in stock j based on the latest available holdings data.  Hence the 
portfolios weights  ij w  reflect fluctuations of the market price of the security held. 
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where  j MKTCAP  is the market capitalization of firm j .  The ownership that would have 
occurred with proportional flows into all funds and unchanged fund stock allocation and stock 
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For each stock, we calculate our central variable, FLOW, as the percent of the shares 
outstanding with mutual fund ownership attributable to flows.  The flow of security  j is given by  
[ ] t j
i
Agg
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This flow has the following interpretation.  If each portfolio manager had made exactly the same 
decisions in terms of percent allocation of his total assets to different stocks, and if stock prices 
were unchanged, but the dollars had flown to each portfolio manager in proportion to their NAV Dumb money – Page 14 
 
for the last k periods, then mutual fund ownership in stock j would be lower by FLOW.  Stocks 
with high FLOW are stocks that are owned by mutual funds that have experienced high inflows.  
C.  Describing the data  
We first describe the data for funds.  Table I shows the top and bottom funds at year end 
for two years out of our sample, 1988 and 1999, ranked on the difference between actual fraction 
of the fund universe (x) and counterfactual fraction (x ˆ ).  In 1999, the Magellan fund has assets 
that constituted 3.8% of our sample mutual fund universe, but had been receiving below average 
inflows over the past three years.  Had Magellan received flows in proportion to its size over the 
previous three years, it would have been 5.4% of the universe instead of 3.8%.  The table shows 
that in 1999, the funds receiving big inflows tended to be technology and growth funds.   
Table II shows some results for individual firms for the years 1999 and 1988.  The table 
shows the top and bottom firms ranked on total dollar flows over the past three years (in the 
analysis, we focus on flows as a percent of market value, but here we rank on dollar flows in 
order to generate familiar names).  The effect of flows on mutual fund ownership can be fairly 
sizeable, with flows raising the total ownership of Sun Microsystems in 1999 from 16.6% to 
20.5%.  In 1999, stocks with the biggest inflows tend to be technology stocks, while stocks with 
the biggest outflows tend to be financial or manufacturing firms, closely correspond to our 
perceptions of investor sentiment in the three year period ending 1999.  In contrast, in 1988, 
technology stocks such as DEC and IBM were experiencing outflows, while consumer goods 
companies like RJR and Pillsbury were experiencing inflows.  Thus sentiment favors different 
types of stocks at different times. 
In interpreting the flow variable, it is important to remember that flow is a relative 
concept driven only by differences in flows and holdings across different funds holding different Dumb money – Page 15 
 
stocks.  Flow is not intended to capture any notion of the absolute popularity of stock.  For 
example, consider Alcoa in 1999.  The fact the flow variable is large and negative in Table II 
does not mean that Alcoa was unpopular with mutual funds, nor does it mean that mutual funds 
were selling Alcoa.  It could be that every mutual fund loved Alcoa, held a lot of it, and bought 
more of it in 1999.  What the negative flow means is that the funds which overweighted Alcoa in 
1999 received lower-than-average inflows (or perhaps outflows) in 1999.  Individual investors 
favored funds which tilted toward stocks like Cisco more than funds which tilted towards stocks 
like Alcoa. 
Table III shows summary statistics for the different types of data in our sample.  Our 
sample starts in 1980.  In table III we describe statistics for flows over the past three years, thus 
the table describes data for flows starting in 1983.  One important feature of the sample is its 
changing nature over time.  We have more information for the latter part of the sample, so our 
matching algorithm system works better in the later years.  As shown in the table, our coverage 
of large stocks is much more complete in the early part of the sample: in 1983, we have flow data 
for 92% of the universe of stocks on a value-weighted basis, but only 47% on an equal weighted 
basis.
2  This difference partially reflects the fact that funds tend to own large stocks, but also the 
fact that we are failing to match some small funds in the early part of the sample period.  One 
possible concern is survivorship bias, which we address in section IV by using a method that 
does not involve matching funds with stocks. 
Table III shows summary statistics for three year flows.  One way of describing FLOW is 
that it is the actual percent ownership by the mutual fund sector, minus the counterfactual percent 
ownership.  Since the actual percent ownership is bounded above by 100%, FLOW is bounded 
above by 100%.  In the counterfactual case, there is no accounting identity enforcing that the Dumb money – Page 16 
 
dollar value of fund holdings is less than the market capitalization of the stock.  Thus FLOW is 
unbounded below.  Values of FLOW less than -100% are very rare, occurring less than 0.01% of 
the time for three year flows. 
III.  Flows and stock returns 
A.  Excess returns 
Table IV shows the basic results of this paper.  We form calendar time portfolios and 
examine monthly excess returns on portfolios constructed using our flow measure.  We show 
both equally weighted returns and value weighted returns in month t for five portfolios formed 
by sorting on the latest available flows as of month  1 - t .  The table shows flows over horizons 
stretching from three months (one quarter, the shortest interval we have for calculating flows) to 
five years.  The rightmost column shows the difference between the high flow stocks and the low 
flow stocks.  
Quintile one is the bottom 20 percent of all stocks sorted on flows.  It turns out that, for 
long-horizon flows, the bottom quintile reflects stocks that are not just experiencing lower-than-
average inflows, they are experiencing outflows.  That is, quintile one contains stocks that 
individual investors are selling (indirectly via mutual funds) and quintile five contains stocks that 
individuals are most heavily buying.   
Looking at the difference between high flow and low flow stocks, it is striking that for 
every horizon but three months, high flows today predict low future stock returns.  This relation 
is statistically significant at the three and five year horizon.  This dumb money effect is sizeable: 
looking at three-year, equal weight results, the difference between high flow and low flow stocks 
is 61 basis points per month or approximately 8 percent per year.  Remarkably, the dumb money 
effect is slightly larger using value weighting instead of equal weighting.  This result stands in Dumb money – Page 17 
 
contrast to many other patterns in stock returns, which tend to be concentrated in small cap 
stocks.
3 
Perhaps surprisingly, in this table we find no solid evidence for the smart money effect in 
raw returns, even at the horizons of three to twelve months where one might expect price 
momentum to dominate.  Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) look at quarterly flows and find that 
high flows predict high returns: one can see a hint of this in the three month flow results, 
although one cannot reject the null hypothesis.  We return to this issue later; it turns out that this 
particular result is sensitive to alternative methods of measuring, and one can find specifications 
with a significant smart money effect at short horizons. 
Figure 1 shows how flows predict returns at various different horizons.  We show the 
average returns in month  k t +  on long/short portfolios formed on three month flows in month t.  
The figure shows average returns over time with accompanying 95% confidence interval.   
For  0 < k , the figure shows how lagged returns predict today' s flows.  The figure shows 
that flows into an individual stock are very strongly influenced by past returns on that stock.  
This result is expected given the previous literature documenting high inflows to high 
performing funds.  Flows tend to go to funds that have high past returns, and since funds returns 
are driven by the stocks that they own, flows tend to go to stocks that have high past returns.  It 
appears that returns over the past twelve months are especially important, with the effect 
decreasing as one goes earlier than a year.  For  0 > k , the figure shows the (insignificant) smart 
money effect at one month horizon, becoming a significant dumb money effect after about a year 
has passed.  The predictable negative returns persist for about a year after that, then fade away.   
We focus on the three-year results in Table IV.  Which horizon is it appropriate to focus 
on?  Why do we focus on the three-year results (where inflows negatively forecast returns) Dumb money – Page 18 
 
instead of the three month results (where inflows positively forecast returns)?  Isn' t the horizon 
arbitrary?  This is an important question.  The answer is that the horizon one should use depends 
on what one is trying to measure.  Since our goal is to understand the long-term effects on 
trading on individual investor wealth, the longer the horizon, the better.  The results for longer 
horizons show that although mutual fund flows do seem to predict short term returns, this effect 
is swamped as we look longer horizons (which cumulate the returns over time).   
To understand whether individuals are "smart" or "dumb", one needs to measure whether 
their trading is raising or lowering their total wealth (compared to some alternative involving 
refraining from trading) over their lifetime.  To take an example, suppose Joe buys a stock from 
Sally for $10, and the next day the price rises to $11.  Based on this evidence alone, one might 
conclude that Joe is smart (and Sally is dumb).  However, if Joe continues to hold the stock, and 
it declines to $5 (at which point he sells it), Joe seems less smart.  Joe could increase his wealth 
by refraining from trade.  In this sense, longer horizons are better horizons for inferring the net 
effect of Joe' s trading.   
In terms of measuring investor experience, however, the evidence given in Table IV 
cannot resolve the question of smart or dumb, because this evidence does not correspond to the 
dollar holdings of any class of investors. One needs to look at all trades and all dollar allocations 
to different securities over time.  In section V, we do this for the aggregate mutual fund investor, 
and show that trading does in fact decrease both average returns and the return/risk ratio for an 
individual who is behaving like the aggregate mutual fund investor.  In turns out that when one 
looks at the whole portfolio, the answer no longer depends on the horizon: the dumb money 
effect exists at all horizons.  From this perspective, then, individual investors in aggregate are 
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B.  Robustness tests 
Figure 2 shows evidence on the dumb money effect over time.  It shows cumulative 
returns on the long/short portfolio formed on three year equal weighted flows (we simply sum 
each monthly return over time).  Figure 2 shows that the last few years of the sample are quite 
influential, with about 100 out of the total of 150 percent coming after 1998.  But the dumb 
money effect is not due only to these years.  The differential return is negative for 17 of the 21 
calendar years available.  One interpretation of the time pattern is that the period around 1999-
2001 was a time of particularly high irrationality, when irrational traders earned particularly low 
returns.
4  Many anomalies grew larger in this period (see Ofek and Richardson (2003)).  Indeed, 
one might propose that if a return pattern does not grow stronger in this period, then it is 
probably not attributable to irrational behavior. 
Table V shows robustness tests.  First, to address the evidence in Figure 2, we split the 
sample into pre-1998 and post-1998 periods.  Although the magnitude of the dumb money effect 
is much larger in the post-1998 period, it has the same sign in both subperiods.  For equal 
weighted portfolios, the three year dumb money effect remains statistically significant in both 
subperiods, while for value weighted portfolios (although the magnitudes are similar to equal 
weighted) the effect is not significantly different from zero in the first part of the sample.  Table 
V also shows results for the sample of stocks which have market cap above and below the CRSP 
median market cap.  Again, over the full sample the dumb money effect remains quite strong 
among large cap stocks.   
One might ask whether the dumb money effect is an implementable strategy for outside 
investors using information available in real time.  Our methodology involves substantial built-in 
staleness of flows, largely reflecting the way that Thomson Financial has structured the data.
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the variables in Table IV are certainly in the information set of any investor who has access to all 
the regulatory filings and reports from mutual funds, as they are filed.  Currently, holdings data 
appear on the SEC EDGAR system on the next business days following a filing, but information 
lags were probably longer at the beginning of the sample period.   
To address this issue, Table V shows results with the flow variables generously lagged an 
additional twelve months.  Even lagged a full year, the three year flow variable remains a 
statistically significant predictor of equal weight returns and close to significant for value weight 
returns (the additional lagging decreases the number of available observations, making inference 
more difficult).  As one might expect given Figure 1, the lagging produces a substantial and 
significant dumb money effect at the short horizons as well.  Thus the dumb money effect is not 
primarily about short-term information contained in flows, it is about long-term mispricing. 
In summary, three year mutual fund flows strongly negatively predict future stock 
returns, and there is no horizon at which flows reliable positively predict excess returns.  The 
dumb money effect is present in both large and small cap stocks, and present in different time 
periods.     
C.  Controlling for size, momentum, and value 
Table VI shows results for returns controlling for size, value, and price momentum.  
These variables are known to predict returns and likely to be correlated with flows.  Sapp and 
Tiwari (2004), for example, argue that the short-horizon smart money effect merely reflects the 
price momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).  If an individual follows a strategy of 
sending money to funds with past high returns in the last year and withdrawing money from 
funds with low returns, then he will end up with a portfolio that overweights high momentum 
stocks and underweights low momentum stocks.  This strategy might be a smart (although high Dumb money – Page 21 
 
turnover) strategy to follow, as long as he keeps rebalancing the strategy.  However, if the 
individual fails to rebalance promptly, eventually he will be holding a portfolio with a strong 
growth tilt.  Thus over long horizons, stocks with high inflows are likely to be stocks with high 
past returns and are therefore likely to be growth stocks.  So it is useful to know whether flows 
have incremental forecasting power for returns or just reflect known patterns of short horizon 
momentum and long horizon value/reversals in stock returns.   
The left hand side of Table VI shows results where returns have been adjusted to control 
for value, size, and momentum.  Following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), it 
subtracts from each stock return the return on a portfolio of firms matched on market equity, 
market-book, and prior one-year return quintiles (a total of 125 matching portfolios).
6  Here the 
dumb money effect is substantially reduced, with the coefficient falling from -0.61 to -0.22 for 
three year equal weighted flows, still significantly negative but less than half as large.  This 
reduction largely reflects the fact that (as we shall see) high sentiment stocks tend to be stocks 
with high market-book.   
The right-hand side of Table VI shows alphas from a Fama and French (1993) three 
factor regression.  Here the reduction of the long-horizon dumb money effect is not as 
substantial, as the three-year equal weighted differential return falls from -0.61 to -0.45.  Both 
methods cause the smart money effect to rise for equal weight returns, although it is still below 
conventional significance levels. 
In Table VII, we take a closer look at the relation between the dumb money effect and the 
value effect by independently sorting all stocks into five flow categories and five market-book 
categories, with a resulting 25 portfolios.  We sort on three year flows, and on market-book ratio 
following the definition of Fama and French (1993).  The right-most column in each panel shows Dumb money – Page 22 
 
whether there is a flow effect within market-to-book quintiles.  Thus if the value effect subsumes 
the dumb money effect, this column should be all zeros.  The bottom row in each panel shows 
whether there is a value effect controlling for flows.  If the dumb money effect subsumes the 
value effect, this row should be all zeros.  If the two effects are statistically indistinguishable, 
then both the row and the column should be all zeros.  
Table VII shows that, generally, neither effect dominates the other.  Looking at equal 
weighted returns, the value effect appears to be much larger than the dumb money effect, with 
magnitudes of approximately one percent per month and high t-statistics.  As before, the dumb 
money effect survives the correction for market-book.  However, looking at value weighted 
returns, the dumb money effect looks stronger than value effect, with similar magnitudes and 
generally higher t-statistics.   
Table VIII shows double sort portfolios for three year past stock returns instead of 
market-book, to explore the reversal effect of De Bondt and Thaler (1985).  In order to make the 
reversal effect as powerful as possible, we sort on past returns lagged one year (in other words, 
we sort on stock returns from month t-48 to t-12).  Here, looking at equal weighted returns, the 
results are similar to Table VII, with the dumb money effect looking slightly weaker.  Looking at 
value weighted returns, the dumb money effect and the reversal effect have similar magnitudes 
and levels of significance. 
To summarize, using standard adjustment techniques, the dumb money effect is not 
completely explained by the value effect.  Neither the dumb money effect nor the value/reversal 
effect dominates the other.  However, the dumb money and value/reversal effect are clearly quite 
related, and perhaps reflect the same underlying phenomenon. Dumb money – Page 23 
 
IV.  Flows and mutual fund returns 
In this section, we set aside our main focus on stock returns, and examine the relation 
between mutual fund flows and mutual fund returns.  This evidence is useful for two purposes.  
First, it shows how our results relate to the previous work of Zheng (1999) and Gruber (1996).  
Second, it shows whether our results are driven by problems in matching the CRSP mutual fund 
database with the holdings database.  Table IX shows results using monthly mutual fund returns 
(instead of stock returns) and sorting on flows into funds instead of flows into stocks.  The 
mutual fund returns reflect, in addition to the returns of the stocks held by the fund, the expenses 
and trading costs of each fund.  The universe of funds includes all domestic equity funds in the 
CRSP mutual fund database. We show returns for both equally weighted and value weighted 
portfolios of funds (where the value weights reflect the NAV of the fund).   
We first sort on actual flows minus counterfactual flows.  Table IX shows first, using 
excess returns, that the dumb money effect comes in fairly strongly at the 3 year horizon, while 
the smart money effect comes in weakly at the 3 month horizon.  Turning next to three-factor 
alphas, here the smart money effect comes in significant at the three-month and six-month 
horizon, while the dumb money effect is weaker for equal weighted results, while still strong for 
value weighted results.  As a robustness check, we also sort on actual inflows (dollar inflows 
divided by assets under management) instead of actual inflows minus counterfactual inflows.  
This slightly different sorting most closely corresponds to the method of Zheng (1999) and 
Gruber (1996).  The results are about the same using this sorting variable. 
How should one interpret these results?  Take for example the equal weighted 3-factor 
alpha results, where three month inflows predict a positive and significant differential of 19 basis 
points per month, while three year inflows predict a negative but insignificant 10 basis points.  Dumb money – Page 24 
 
Suppose one believes that the Fama-French (1993) model is an appropriate risk adjustment.  The 
fact that the differential is -0.10 percent for three year inflows means that the trading of 
individuals is not helping them achieve higher risk-adjusted average returns.  Despite the fact 
that individuals earn significant and positive 0.19 percent differential in the first three months, 
this outperformance is wasted because the individuals are not following a dynamic strategy of 
buying the best-performing funds, holding them for a quarter, and them selling them.  Instead, 
they are in aggregate following a strategy of buying the best-performing funds, and holding them 
for a long period of time.  So the longer horizon return shows that investors are not actually 
benefiting from their trading. 
To summarize, looking at mutual fund returns, there is a strong dumb money effect 
among large funds (when value weighting).  Looking at smaller funds (equal weighting), the 
dumb money effect is weaker, especially when correcting for value.  Similar to previous results, 
we find a smart money effect at the quarterly horizon.  However, this smart money effect is not 
enough to boost investor returns over the long term.  For a more economically relevant measure 
of how these two effects balance out, in the next section we look at how the aggregate mutual 
fund investor is helped or hurt by his trading. 
V.  Economic significance to the aggregate investor 
A.  The magnitude of wealth destruction 
So far, we have shown that stocks owned by funds with large inflows have poor 
subsequent returns.  In this section, we measure the wealth consequences of active reallocation 
across funds, for the average investor.  We assess the economic significance by measuring the 
average return earned by a representative investor, and comparing it to the return he could have 
earned by simply refraining from engaging in non-proportional flows.  We examine both returns Dumb money – Page 25 
 
on stocks and returns on mutual funds. 
Define R
ACTUAL as the return earned by a representative mutual investor who owns a tiny 
fraction of each existing mutual fund.  The returns would reflect a portfolio of stocks where the 
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We use three year flows in these calculations.  Table X shows excess returns on these two 
portfolios, and for comparison shows the value weighted market return as well.  Since the two 
mutual fund portfolios use weights based on dollar holdings, they are of course quite similar to 
each other and to the market portfolio.   
  Although very similar, these portfolios are not identical.  Table X shows investor flows 
cause a significant reduction in both average returns and Sharpe ratios earned by mutual fund 
investors.  A representative investor who is currently behaving like the aggregate mutual fund 
sector could increase his Sharpe ratio 9% (from a monthly Sharpe ratio of 0.137 to 0.149) by 
refraining from active reallocation and just directing his flows proportionally.
7   
  One can assess the significance of this difference in mean returns by looking at the 
returns on the long-short portfolio R
ACTUAL - R
NOFLOW.  This return is similar to the long-short 
portfolio studied in Table IV, except that here all stocks owned by the mutual fund sector are 
included, and the weights are proportional to the dollar value of the holdings.  The differential 
returns are negative and highly significant.  Thus investor flows cause wealth destruction.  This Dumb money – Page 26 
 
conclusion is, of course, a partial equilibrium statement.  If all investors switched to proportional 
flows, presumably stock prices would change to reflect that.  But for one individual investor, it 
appears that fund flows are harmful to wealth.   
B.  Better identification of mutual fund manager skill 
Table X also helps disentangle the effect of flows from the effect of manager stock picking.  We 
start by considering the average of R
ACTUAL – R
M, which measures the net return benefit of 
owning the aggregate fund holdings instead of holding the market (ignoring trading costs and 
expenses).  R
M is the return on the CRSP value weighted market.  The average of this difference, 
0.03, consists of two components.  The first, R
ACTUAL - R
NOFLOW, is the net benefit of 
reallocations.  We already have seen that this dumb money effect is negative.  The second, 
R
NOFLOW – R
M, measures the ability of the mutual fund managers to pick stocks which 
outperform the market (using value weights for managers).  As shown in the table, using raw 
returns, this stock picking effect is 0.08 per month, with a t-statistic of 1.8.  Thus there is some 
modest evidence that mutual fund managers do have the ability to pick stocks that outperform 
the market, once one controls for their clients’ tendencies of switching money from one fund to 
another.  As shown in the table, this modest skill is obscured (when looking only at actual 
holdings) by their clients anti-skill at picking funds.  
C.  Different measures of economic significance 
We explore the robustness of the economic significance in two ways.  First, in the bottom 
part of Table X, we repeat the basic analysis, again using three year flows but using funds 
instead of stocks.  We define R
ACTUAL and R
NOFLOW using fund returns instead of stock returns 
(plugging in actual fund returns for the term in brackets in equations (9) and (10)).  Again, as in 
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holdings.  On the other hand, the cost of this specification is that the results now also reflect 
issues such as fund expenses, fund turnover and trading costs, and fund cash holdings. 
Looking at the dumb money effect, the results using mutual funds are nearly identical to 
the results using stocks: -0.05 percent per month.  So, measured using either mutual fund returns 
or stock returns, investors are lowering their wealth and their Sharpe ratios by engaging in 
disproportionate fund flows.  A simple passive strategy would dominate the actual strategy of the 
aggregate mutual fund investors.  
The results for mutual funds also give us some context for the economic magnitude of the 
wealth destruction due to fund flows.  The total net benefit of mutual funds, R
ACTUAL – R
M, is 
-0.12 percent per month, or about 1.4 percent cost per year.  Of this -0.12, almost half, -0.05, is 
explained by dumb money effect.  Of course, this calculation may be misleading because the 
return earned by the CRSP value weight portfolio is not a viable free alternative.  We have 
redone the calculation, substituting the return on the Vanguard index fund for R
M (these returns 
includes fees and costs).  In this case, the total wealth destruction is -0.16 instead of -0.12 
(reflecting the fact the Vanguard fund outperformed the CRSP value weight portfolio during this 
period), while the dumb money effect remains of course at -0.05.  Thus looking at the two 
measures, fund flows appear to account for between a third and a half of the dismal performance 
earned by the average mutual fund investor: individual investors have only themselves to blame.  
Still, mutual managers do not emerge unscathed from Table X.  As usual (see for example 
Malkiel, 1995), costs and expenses eat up any stock picking ability managers have, so that the 
net benefit of stock picking in Table X is -0.07 per month.   
 In Table XI, we show the stock return measures of wealth destruction and stock picking 
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showed up in some the specifications, it does not show up here.  Even at the three month 
horizon, we find no evidence that trading helps investors earn higher returns.  Thus from an 
economic perspective, the short term trading done by mutual fund investors does not seem smart. 
VI.  Issuance 
If individual investors (acting through mutual funds) lose money on their trades, who is 
making money?  Possible candidates include hedge funds, pension funds, other institutions, or 
individuals trading individual stocks.  Here we focus on another class of traders: firms.  In 
contrast to trading by individuals, reflecting uninformed and possibly irrational demand, the 
actions of firms represents informed and probably more rational supply.  A substantial body of 
research studies whether firms opportunistically take advantage of mispricing by issuing equity 
when it is overpriced and buying it back when it is underpriced (for example Loughran and 
Ritter, 1995).  Corporate managers certainly say they are trying to time the market (Graham and 
Harvey, 2001).   
We measure firm behavior using the composite share issuance measure of Daniel and 
Titman (2004), which combines a variety of previously documented effects involving 
repurchases, mergers, and seasoned equity issues (see also Pontiff and Woodgate, 2005).  Our 
version of their variable is 1 minus the firm’s ratio of the number of shares outstanding one year 
ago to the number of shares outstanding today.
8  For example, if the company has 100 shares and 
has a seasoned equity issue of an additional 50 shares, the composite issuance measure is 33%, 
meaning that 33% of the existing shares today were issued in the last year.  The measure can be 
negative (reflecting for example repurchases) or positive (reflecting for example executive stock 
options, seasoned equity offerings, or stock-financed mergers).  Issuance and market-book ratios 
are strongly related: growth firms tend to issue stock, value firms tend to repurchase stock.    Dumb money – Page 29 
 
Daniel and Titman (2004), show that when issuance is high, returns are low over the next year.  
This pattern suggests that firms issue and repurchase stock in response to mispricing. 
Table XII shows the relation of annual issuance to past three-year flows, using the usual 
format but studying issuance instead of returns.  The table shows issuance between January and 
December of year t, sorted on 3-year flows as of December in year t-1.  The table uses the 
standard portfolio logic of forming groups, taking the average in each group for each of the 20 
years available, and reporting the mean and t-statistic for the resulting 20 time series 
observations.  
The first row shows that firms with the lowest three year inflows issue one percent less 
stock than firms with the highest inflows.  Thus inflows are positively associated with issuance 
by firms.  Firms tend to increase shares outstanding this year when previous year’s flows are 
high.  One interpretation of this pattern is that firms are seizing the opportunity to issue stock 
when sentiment is high, and repurchase stock when sentiment is low. Since the average issuance 
measure (which is as a fraction of shares outstanding) is around three percent per year in this 
sample, one percent is a large number.   
The rest of the table shows robustness tests for this basic result.  The next row shows 
value weighted results, which (as usual for flows) are somewhat stronger.  The next row shows a 
truncated version of the issuance variable.  Since the issuance variable as defined is unbounded 
below, we define trimmed issuance as max ( -100, issuance).  This change has little effect.  We 
also look at the relation in the two different halves of the sample.  As before, the relation is 
stronger in the second half of the sample, but significant always.  Lastly, because issuance is 
known to be correlated with valuation, we create characteristic-adjusted issuance in the same 
way we create characteristic-adjusted returns in Table VI.  The last row of Table XII shows the Dumb money – Page 30 
 
average deviations of issuance from a group of matching firms with similar size, valuation, and 
price momentum as of December.  The results are about the same as with raw issuance, so that 
once again value does not subsume the effect of flows. 
To understand the economic magnitudes shown in Table XII, it is useful to know that the 
difference in the sorting variable (three year flows) is about 12 percent between the top and 
bottom quintile.  That is, the top quintile has had three year flows that are on average 12 percent 
more as a percent of shares outstanding than the bottom quintile.  This number is the same units 
as the numbers in Table XII since both flows and issuance are expressed as a fraction of current 
shares outstanding.  Thus firms with flows that are 12 percent higher as a fraction of shares 
outstanding tend to increase shares by 1 percent of shares outstanding.  Over three years, the firm 
would issue shares equivalent to three percent of shares outstanding.  Thus over time, one can 
loosely say that firms respond to $12 billion in flows by issuing $3 billion in stock.  Supply 
accommodates approximately one quarter of the increase in demand. 
VII.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have shown that individual investors have a striking ability to do the 
wrong thing.  They send their money to mutual funds which own stocks that do poorly over the 
subsequent years.  Individual investors are dumb money, and one can use their mutual fund 
reallocation decisions to predict future stock returns.  The dumb money effect is robust to a 
variety of different control variables, is not entirely due to one particular time period (although 
concentrated around the year 2000), and is implementable using real-time information.  By doing 
the opposite of individuals, one can construct a portfolio with high returns. Individuals hurt 
themselves by their decisions, and we calculate that aggregate mutual fund investor could raise 
his Sharpe ratio by 9% simply by refraining from destructive behavior.  These facts pose a Dumb money – Page 31 
 
challenge to rational theories of fund flows.  Of course, rational theories of mutual fund investor 
behavior already face many formidable challenges, such as explaining why investors consistently 
invest in active managers when lower cost, better performing index funds are available. 
We have found mixed evidence on a smart money effect of short-term flows positively 
predicting short-term returns.  One interpretation of this effect is that there is some short-term 
manager skill which is detected by investors.  Another hypothesis, explored by Wermers (2004) 
and Coval and Stafford (2005), is that mutual fund inflows actually push prices higher.  Another 
possibility, explored by Sapp and Tiwari (2004) is that by chasing past returns, investors are 
stumbling into a valuable momentum strategy.  Whatever the explanation, it is clear that the 
higher returns earned at the short horizon are not effectively captured by individual investors.  Of 
course, it could be that some subset of individuals benefit from trading, but looking at the 
aggregate holdings of mutual funds by all individuals, we show that individuals as a whole are 
hurt in the long run by their reallocations.   
Although the dumb money effect is statistically distinct from the value/reversal effect, it is 
clear these two effects are highly related.  It is remarkable that one is able to recover many 
features of the value effect without actually looking at prices or returns for individual stocks.  In 
our sample, the value effect is generally bigger than the dumb money effect among small cap 
stocks, but the dumb money effect looks at least as big among large cap stocks. 
The evidence on issuers and flows presents a somewhat nonstandard portrait of capital 
markets.  Past papers have looked at institutions vs. individuals, and tried to test if institutions 
take advantage of individuals.  Here, the story is different.  Individuals do trade poorly, but these 
trades are executed through their dynamic allocation across mutual funds, that is, via financial 
institutions.  As far as we can tell, it is not financial institutions that exploit the individuals, but Dumb money – Page 32 
 
rather the non-financial institutions that issue stock and repurchase stock.  Stocks go in and out 
of favor with individual investors, and firms exploit this sentiment by trading in the opposite 
direction of individuals, selling stock when individuals want to buy it.  We find some modest 
evidence that mutual fund managers have stock picking skill, but that any skill is swamped by 
other effects including the actions of retail investors in switching their money across funds.  In 
our data, financial institutions seem more like passive intermediaries who facilitate trade 
between the dumb money, individuals, and the smart money, firms. 
It is clear that any satisfactory theory of the value effect will need to explain three facts.  
First, value stocks have higher average returns than growth stocks.  Second, using various 
issuance mechanisms, the corporate sector tends to sell growth stocks and buy value stocks.  
Third, individuals, using mutual funds, tend to buy growth stocks and sell value stocks.  One 
coherent explanation of these three facts is that individual investor sentiment causes some stocks 
to be misvalued relative to other stocks, and that firms exploit this mispricing. Dumb money – Page 33 
 
ENDNOTES
                                                 
1 We handle missing reports as follows: whenever a fund has a missing report between two valid 
report dates, we assume that the fund did not change its holdings with respect to the previous 
report. 
2 As shown in Table III, we are only able to match 70% of the funds in the CRSP mutual fund 
database to the holdings data base in 1983; this number rises over time but is never 100%.  In 
addition to this pure data problem, mutual funds as a whole grew larger as a fraction of the entire 
stock market.  Thus our coverage of individual stocks rises over time for these two reasons.   
3  Zheng (1999), for example, shows the smart money effect is concentrated in small cap stocks. 
4 Another possible explanation is that the pattern in Figure 2 is somehow due to our ability to 
match funds with stocks, which improves over the sample period.  To address this, we have 
calculated a version of Figure 2 based only on the mutual fund returns and flows used in section 
IV, and found very similar results.  Thus the pattern in Figure 2 is not an artifact of our data 
matching process. 
5 The data shows holdings for points in time that reflect both a “vintage”  file date (FDATE) and 
a report date. Neither of the two dates corresponds to the actual filing date with the SEC. The 
report date is the calendar day when a snapshot of the portfolio is recorded, while Thomson 
Financial always assigns file dates to the corresponding quarter ends of the filings. The report 
date coincides with the file date about 60% of the time, but in some cases dates back as much as 
6 months prior to the file date, as fund manager have discretion about when to take a snapshot of 
their portfolio to be filed at a subsequent date.  These holdings eventually become public 
information. For accuracy, we always use the end of quarter file date assigned by Thomson 
Financial.  This quarterly interval introduces a source of staleness into the holdings data.   Dumb money – Page 34 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 These 125 portfolios are reformed every month based on the market equity, M/B ratio, and 
prior year return from the previous month.  The portfolios are equal weighted and the quintiles 
are defined with respect to the entire universe in that month. 
7 Lamont (2002) finds similar results for the policy of refraining from buying new issues. 
8 We split-adjust the number of shares using CRSP "factor to adjust shares" Dumb money – Page 35 
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Data Appendix 
A.  Holdings data and error screens 
    We obtain data on stock holdings from the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Mutual 
Funds database. Since our focus is on US equity funds, we remove all US-based international 
funds, fixed-income funds, real estate funds and precious metal funds. 
Holdings are identified by CUSIPs, they constitute most of the equities, but are not 
necessarily the entire equity holdings of the manager or fund. The potential exclusions include: 
small holdings (typically under 10,000 shares or $200,000), cases where there may be 
confidentiality issues, reported holdings that could not be matched to a master security file, and 
cases where two or more managers share control (since the SEC requires only one manager in 
such a case to include the holdings information in their report).  
Thomson  identifies  funds  using  a  five-digit  number  (FUNDNO)  but  unfortunately 
numbered identifiers are reused in the data, hence we use a filter to identify new born-funds and 
generate a unique fund identifier. We start tracking funds as they appear in the database, a fund 
is then classified as a new-born fund and assigned a new unique identifier whenever there is a 
gap of more than 1 year between the current report and the last available report. A gap of more 
than  one  year  between  two  consecutive  reports  typically  reflects  a  different  and  unrelated 
manager or a major reorganization of the fund.  
Holding are adjusted for stock splits, stock distributions, mergers and acquisitions and 
other corporate events that occur between the report date and the file date. This adjustment relies 
on the assumption by Thomson that funds report shares held on a pre-adjustment basis. 
We merge the holdings with the CRSP/COMPUSTAT data and we use a series of filters Dumb money – Page 39 
 
to eliminate potential anomalies, probably due to misreporting, errors in data collecting or in 
computing adjustments. Holdings are set to missing whenever: 
1.  The report date is subsequent to the file date  
2.  The number of shares in a fund portfolio exceeds the total amount of shares outstanding 
at a particular date 
3.  The total amount of shares outstanding reported by CRSP is zero at a particular date 
B.  Merging Thomson and CRSP data 
The CRSP mutual fund database utilizes a five character alpha-numeric identifier (ICDI). 
Both  database  report  funds  names  but  they  use  a  different  character  string  with  different 
abbreviations. To match the two datasets we use a matching procedure base on TICKER symbols 
and fund names, similar in spirit to the technique proposed by Wermers (2000). 
Thomson Financial reports fund tickers on a quarterly basis starting from the first quarter 
of  1999.  For  fund  portfolios  offering  multiple  share  classes,  multiple  ticker  symbols  are 
provided. A combination of ticker-date typically uniquely identifies a mutual fund. First, we 
merge the two databases using a ticker-date match between the first quarter of 1999 and the last 
quarter of 2003. We generate a list of unique matches between the CRSP fund identifier and the 
unique identifier in the Thomson data computed above, and extrapolate backwards for the prior 
years.  
After  this  initial  merge,  we  use  a  “fuzzy”  string  matching  algorithm  to  match  the 
remaining funds.  We use a “SOUNDEX” algorithm to match funds using their name and the 
corresponding date. The SOUNDEX algorithms were patented by Margaret I. Odell in 1918 and 
Robert C. Russell in 1922. They are based on an underlying principle of English and other Indo-Dumb money – Page 40 
 
European languages. That is, most of the words can be reasonably represented by consonants 
alone. All the names are reduced to a phonetic equivalent character strings which can later be 
compared. We transform fund names into an alpha-numeric indicator by using the following 
steps:  
1.  Retain the first letter of the fund name and discard the letters A E H I O U W Y  
2.  Assign a numeric value to the following consonant: 1 ® B F P V, 2 ® C G J K 
Q S Z, 3 ® D T, 4  ®L, 5 ® M N, 6 ® R 
3.  Discard all duplicate classification values if they are adjacent (that is BB will 
results in the single value 1)  
 
 We use the resulting strings to match the remaining funds at every quarterly date, and we 
discard every fund for which we could not find a corresponding match. Below we show a portion 
of the matched file:  
date  CDA 
Fund 
ID 
Thomson  name  CRSP 
ICDI 
CRSP name 
12/31/2003  204  LORD ABBETT RES LG CAP S  13848  Lord Abbett Large Cap Research Fund/Y 
03/31/1995  205  HERITAGE SER TR-VAL EQTY  13596  Heritage Series Trust:Value Equity Fund/A 
06/30/1995  205  HERITAGE SER TR-VAL EQTY  13596  Heritage Series Trust:Value Equity Fund/A 
06/30/1995  205  HERITAGE SER TR-VAL EQTY  13598  Heritage Series Trust:Value Equity Fund/C 
09/30/1995  205  HERITAGE SER TR-VAL EQTY  13596  Heritage Series Trust:Value Equity Fund/A 
09/30/1995  205  HERITAGE SER TR-VAL EQTY  13598  Heritage Series Trust:Value Equity Fund/C 
12/31/1995  205  HERITAGE SER TR-VAL EQTY  13596  Heritage Series Trust:Value Equity Fund/A 
12/31/1995  205  HERITAGE SER TR-VAL EQTY  13598  Heritage Series Trust:Value Equity Fund/C 
09/30/2000  252  LIBERTY STRATEGIC BALANC  12722  Liberty Strategic Balanced Fund/B 
09/30/2000  252  LIBERTY STRATEGIC BALANC  12724  Liberty Strategic Balanced Fund/C 
01/31/1995  253  GOLDMAN S BALANCED FD  13706  Goldman Sachs Tr:Balanced Fund 
07/31/1995  253  GOLDMAN S BALANCED FD  13706  Goldman Sachs Tr:Balanced Fund 
01/31/1996  253  GOLDMAN S BALANCED FD  13706  Goldman Sachs Tr:Balanced Fund 
07/31/1996  253  GOLDMAN S BALANCED FD  13706  Goldman Sachs Tr:Balanced Fund 
01/31/1997  253  GOLDMAN S BALANCED FD  13706  Goldman Sachs Equity Port:Balanced Fund/A 
07/31/1997  253  GOLDMAN S BALANCED FD  09039  Goldman Sachs Equity Port:Balanced Fund/C 
 
In the CRSP database, if a fund has multiple share classes, each share class is classified Dumb money – Page 41 
 
as a separate entity. Different share classes have the same portfolio composition and are treated 
as a single fund in the Thomson database (for example fund # 205 in the table above). Therefore 
we combine multiple share classes in the CRSP data into a unique “super fund” by aggregating 
the corresponding net asset values, and computing the weighted average return of the fund using 
the total net asset value of the different share classes as weights.  
As  a  final  step,  to  ensure  matching  quality,  we  compare  the  net  asset  values  of  the 
matched funds reported by CRSP to the dollar value of their holdings, and discard matches 
where the total asset value of the fund reported by CRSP differs from the sum of the dollar 
holdings value by more than 100%.  
The universe of mutual funds in our final sample tends to be larger than those in previous 
studies that use similar string matching algorithms. Wermers (2000) obtain a sample of 1,788 
funds matched between 1975 and 1994. Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005) use a sample of 
1,917 unique equity funds between 1984 and 1999. Cohen, Coval and Pastor  (2004) reported 
235 funds matched at the end of 1980 and 1,526 matched funds in the second quarter of 2002. 
Our sample includes 3,221 unique funds between the first quarter of 1980 and the last quarter of 
2003, with the number of funds starting from 200 funds in 1980 to 2,297 in 2003. Our matched 
sample covers on average about 81% of the dollar assets of the total universe of CRSP equity 
funds, with the level starting from 70% in 1980 and rising to 95% in 2003. As a final check of 
matching quality, we randomly extract 100 matched funds from the merged file and we hand-
checked using both databases. In all 100 cases, we could not find errors in the matching process.  
C.  Construction of the counterfactual flows  
We assign a counterfactual net asset value of zero to funds that were newly created in the Dumb money – Page 42 
 
past k quarters. New funds represent new flows, but in the counterfactual exercise they do not 
receive assets for the first k  quarters. The universe of funds we consider when computing the 
counterfactual flows between date  k t -  and date t is funds there were alive at both date  k t -  
and t.   
More specifically, consider at generic date t and let 
Agg
s F   be the actual aggregate flows 
for all funds alive in quarter t (including funds who were recently born, but excluding funds that 
die in month t), for  t s k t £ £ - . Let 
Agg
k - t N  be the lagged actual aggregate NAV aggregating only 
over those funds that exist in both month  k t -  and in month t. We compute the counterfactual 












- =     (1) 
t s k t £ £ -       (2) 
For funds that die in quarter  1 + s  (so that their last NAV is quarter s), we set 
i
1 s F ˆ
+  = 
i
s N ˆ -  and 
i
h s N + ˆ = 0 for all  0 > h .  
Table A shows a simplified example where we set k = 1 year. Fund # 3 is born in 1981, 
therefore in 1981 we register a net inflow equal to its initial NAV and set the counterfactual 
NAV to zero. In 1981 two funds are alive, fund # 1 and fund #2, and in 1980 they represented 
2/3 and 1/3 of the total fund sector. Aggregate flows in 1981 were equal to $150, hence in the 
counterfactual exercise we assign a flow of $100 to fund # 1 (as opposed to the actual realized 
flow of $50) and a flow of $50 to fund # 2. Given the return of the two funds between 1980 and 
1981, we can compute the counterfactual net asset value of fund # 1 and # 2 in 1981. Proceeding 
in the same manner whenever a fund is alive at date  k t -  and t, we track the evolution of the Dumb money – Page 43 
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t R    (3) 
Between 1982 and 1993 fund # 2 dies, hence in the counterfactual world we assign an outflow in 
1983 equal to the NAV in 1982 and set the counterfactual NAV to zero thereafter.  Note that (2) 
does not guarantee that counterfactual net asset values are always non-negative in quarters where 
we have aggregate outflows (
Agg
t F  < 0 ). In this case we override (2) , set  0 N ˆ i
t =  and redistribute 
the corresponding counterfactual flows to the remaining funds, to keep the total aggregate dollar 
outflow the same in both the counterfactual and actual case. Measuring FLOW over 12 quarters, 
negative counterfactual NAVs occur for only 0.12% of the sample.  
Finally, we handle mergers as follows: we assume that investors keep earning returns on 
the existing assets of the surviving fund. For consistency, when constructing the counterfactual 
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This figure shows the average returns in month t+k on a long/short portfolios formed on three 
month flows in month t.  The figure shows average returns over time of a zero cost portfolio that 
holds the top 20% stocks and sells short the bottom 20% stocks and the accompanying 95% 
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This figure shows cumulative returns on a long/short portfolios formed on three year flows in 
month t. At the beginning of every calendar month stocks are ranked in ascending order based on 
the last available flow. The figure shows the cumulative sum of monthly returns over  time of a 
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Table I: Flows by fund, selected dates 
 
This table shows the top and bottom funds ranked on the difference between then actual and 
counterfactual weight in the aggregate mutual fund sector.  x is the fund’s actual percent of 
dollar value of the total mutual fund universe in the sample. x ˆ  is counterfactual percent, using a 
horizon of three years. 
 
 
  Percent of fund 
universe, 
actual 




  x  x ˆ    
December 1999 
Bottom 5 funds        
FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND  3.75  5.35  -1.60 
INVEST. CO. OF AMERICA  1.99  2.73  -0.74 
VANGUARD WINDSOR FUND  1.55  2.20  -0.65 
FIDELITY CONTRAFUND  1.71  2.30  -0.59 
TWENTIETH CENTURY ULTRA  1.55  2.04  -0.49 
Top 5 funds        
VANGUARD INDEX - GROWTH  0.56  0.09  0.47 
ALLIANCE PRMIER GROWTH  0.63  0.07  0.56 
JANUS WORLDWIDE FUND  1.20  0.60  0.60 
JANUS VALUE FUND  1.31  0.69  0.62 
VANGUARD INDEX TRUST  3.71  2.96  0.75 
       
December 1988 
Bottom 5 funds        
WINDSOR FUND  4.60  5.82  -1.22 
DREYFUS FUND  1.78  2.71  -0.93 
PRICE (ROWE) GROWTH STK.  1.02  1.91  -0.88 
IDS STOCK FUND  0.96  1.79  -0.83 
INVEST. CO. OF AMERICA  3.25  4.04  -0.78 
Top 5 funds        
FIDELITY OTC PORTFOLIO  0.57  0.20  0.37 
FRANKLIN UTILITIES  0.48  0.10  0.38 
EVERGREEN TOTAL RETURN  1.02  0.27  0.75 
WASH. MUTUAL INVESTORS  2.18  1.27  0.91 
FIDELITY MAGELLAN FUND  7.08  5.66  1.42 
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Table II: Flows by stock, selected dates 
 
This table shows the top and bottom stocks ranked on dollar FLOW, using three year flows.  z is 
the stock’s actual percent of the total  dollar value of mutual fund holdings divided by the stock’s 
market capitalization.  z ˆ  is counterfactual percent, using a horizon of three years. Flow is the 
three year FLOW, defined as the stock’s actual percent of the total dollar value of mutual fund 
holdings divided by the stock’s market capitalization minus the counterfactual percent, using a 
horizon of three years. 
 
  Percent owned by mutual funds   
  Actual  Counterfactual   
  z   z ˆ   FLOW 
December 1999 
BOTTOM FIVE STOCKS       
CENDANT CORP  35.6  46.5  -10.9 
VIACOM INC  42.8  48.3  -5.5 
FEDERATED DEPT STORES INC DEL  34.2  45.0  -10.8 
ALCOA INC  26.9  31.2  -4.3 
ASSOCIATES FIRST CAPITAL CORP  37.5  43.6  -6.0 
       
TOP FIVE STOCKS       
CISCO SYSTEMS INC  17.8  15.2  2.6 
MICROSOFT CORP  12.6  11.6  1.0 
SUN MICROSYSTEMS INC  20.5  16.6  3.9 
DELL INC  12.3  9.0  3.2 
INTEL CORP  11.4  10.2  1.2 
December 1988 
BOTTOM FIVE STOCKS       
DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP  7.6  9.1  -1.6 
CITICORP  16.7  18.9  -2.2 
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC  7.1  8.6  -1.5 
FORD MOTOR CO DEL  10.4  11.0  -0.6 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHS COR  3.0  3.2  -0.2 
       
TOP FIVE STOCKS       
REYNOLDS R J INDUSTRIES INC  2.7  1.7  1.0 
PILLSBURY COMPANY  4.0  0.4  3.6 
PLACER DOME INC  8.7  2.3  6.4 
DISNEY WALT CO  5.4  3.4  2.0 
BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB CO  3.9  2.8  1.1 Dumb money – Page 48 
 
Table III: Summary statistics for three year flows, 1983-2003 
 
This table shows summary statistics as of December of each year. Percent coverage of stock 
universe (EW) is the number of stocks with a valid three year FLOW, divided by total number of 
CRSP stocks. Percent coverage of stock universe (VW) is the total market capitalization of 
stocks with a valid three year FLOW, divided by the total market value of the CRSP stock 
universe. Percent coverage of fund universe (EW) is the total number of funds in the sample 
divided by the total number of equity funds in the CRSP mutual fund universe. Percent coverage 
of fund universe (VW) is the total net asset value of funds in the sample divided by the total net 
asset value of equity funds in the CRSP mutual fund universe. NAV is the total net asset value of 
a fund, in millions.  x is the fund’s actual percent of dollar value of the total mutual fund 
universe in the sample. x ˆ  is counterfactual percent, using a horizon of three years.   z is the 
stock’s actual percent of the total dollar value of mutual fund holdings divided by the stock’s 
market capitalization.  z ˆ  is counterfactual percent, using a horizon of three years. Flow is the 
three year FLOW, defined as the stock’s actual percent of the total dollar value of mutual fund 
holdings divided by the stock’s market capitalization minus the counterfactual percent, using a 
horizon of three years. 
 
  Min  Max  Mean  Std 
Dev  Mean 
  Full sample, 1983-2003  1983  2003 
Time-series   (21 annual observations, 1983-2003) 
Number of funds in the sample per year  253  2439  1110  811  253  2297 
Number of stocks in the sample per year  2875  6763  4822  1349  2875  4907 
Percent coverage of  stock universe (EW)  48.5  91.7  71.2  15.8  48.5  91.7 
Percent coverage of  stock universe (VW)  84.5  99.7  97.0  4.0  91.6  99.6 
Percent coverage of  fund universe (EW)  51.1  85.9  68.3  11.6  70.2  85.9 
Percent coverage of  fund universe (VW)  75.6  97.3  86.8  7.5  79.6  95.1 
Funds (23 thousand pooled year-fund observations, 1983-2003) 
NAV, millions of dollars  0  109073  819  3355  210  811 
Number of holdings per fund  1  4162  149  253  70  183 
x  (Percent of fund universe, actual)  0.00  7.97  0.13  0.38  0.49  0.05 
x ˆ  (Percent of fund universe, counterfactual)  0.00  9.69  0.15  0.47  0.67  0.06 
Stocks (333 thousand pooled stock-fund observations, 1983-2003) 
Number of funds per stock  1  1001  26  54  5  50 
z  (Percent owned by funds, actual)  0.00  99.75  10.10  10.23  6.07  10.60 
z ˆ  (Percent owned by funds, counterfactual)  0.00  563.77  9.82  11.27  4.57  9.41 
Flow  -497.01  84.35  0.36  5.93  1.21  2.16 Dumb money – Page 49 
 
Table IV : Calendar time portfolio, excess returns 1980 – 2003 
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio returns. At the beginning of every calendar month 
stocks are ranked in ascending order based on the last available flow. Stocks are assigned to one 
of five portfolios.  L/S is a zero cost portfolio that holds the top 20% stocks and sells short the 
bottom 20% stocks.  Portfolios are rebalanced monthly to maintain equal or value weights.  We 
report average returns in excess of the Treasury bill rate. Returns are in monthly percent, t-
statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates. 
 
  Low 
flow 
      High 
flow 
High flow minus 
low flow 
  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  L/S 
Equal weight 
Three month flow  0.73  0.80  0.80  0.71  0.84  0.11 
  (2.05)  (2.34)  (2.13)  (1.91)  (2.15)  (0.57) 
             
Six month flow  0.77  0.84  0.83  0.73  0.74  -0.03 
  (2.16)  (2.43)  (2.20)  (1.95)  (1.87)  (0.15) 
             
One year flow  0.79  0.95  0.83  0.67  0.67  -0.12 
  (2.29)  (2.79)  (2.16)  (1.78)  (1.67)  (0.56) 
             
Three year flow  1.03  1.07  0.83  0.66  0.42  -0.61 
  (2.98)  (3.01)  (2.16)  (1.65)  (1.02)  (3.37) 
             
Five year flow  0.99  0.99  0.97  0.79  0.67  -0.32 
  (2.72)  (2.56)  (2.25)  (1.96)  (1.58)  (2.37) 
Value weight 
Three month flow  0.67  0.69  0.34  0.58  0.71  0.04 
  (2.10)  (2.40)  (1.12)  (1.96)  (1.91)  (0.17) 
             
Six month flow  0.73  0.67  0.61  0.54  0.53  -0.19 
  (2.29)  (2.31)  (2.17)  (1.77)  (1.44)  (0.73) 
             
One year flow  0.74  0.87  0.59  0.45  0.46  -0.27 
  (2.41)  (3.01)  (2.14)  (1.43)  (1.24)  (1.09) 
             
Three year flow  0.96  0.93  0.79  0.52  0.29  -0.67 
  (3.07)  (3.35)  (2.77)  (1.64)  (0.73)  (2.79) 
             
Five year flow  0.95  0.76  0.69  0.54  0.45  -0.50 
  (3.00)  (2.53)  (2.14)  (1.47)  (1.05)  (1.92) 
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Table V: Robustness tests 
 
This table shows returns on high flow stocks minus returns on low flow stocks, using calendar 
time portfolio returns.  “Larger cap stocks” are all stocks with market capitalization above the 
median of the CRSP universe that month, smaller stocks are below median.  Returns are in 
monthly percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates 
 
  1981-1997  1998-2003  Larger  Smaller  Flows 
      cap  Cap  Lagged 12 months 
Equal weight 
Three month flow  0.01  0.41  0.18  0.20  -0.45 
  (0.06)  (0.60)  (0.80)  (1.18)  (2.37) 
           
Six month flow  -0.10  0.15  -0.03  0.05  -0.49 
  (0.81)  (0.22)  (0.13)  (0.28)  (2.62) 
           
One year flow  0.03  -0.53  -0.07  -0.13  -0.59 
  (0.26)  (0.76)  (0.28)  (0.69)  (3.01) 
           
Three year flow  -0.28  -1.41  -0.52  -0.56  -0.38 
  (2.19)  (2.67)  (2.66)  (2.57)  (2.59) 
           
Five year flow  -0.30  -0.38  -0.23  -0.41  -0.24 
  (2.45)  (1.11)  (1.50)  (2.14)  (2.08) 
Value weight 
Three month flow  -0.12  0.48  0.03  0.44  -0.59 
  (0.75)  (0.55)  (0.13)  (2.57)  (2.10) 
           
Six month flow  -0.33  0.18  -0.21  0.24  -0.62 
  (1.96)  (0.20)  (0.77)  (1.39)  (2.17) 
           
One year flow  -0.05  -0.89  -0.28  0.07  -0.66 
  (0.29)  (1.08)  (1.10)  (0.34)  (2.54) 
           
Three year flow  -0.21  -1.77  -0.66  -0.43  -0.42 
  (1.20)  (2.59)  (2.76)  (2.09)  (1.85) 
           
Five year flow  -0.18  -1.18  -0.50  -0.37  -0.26 
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Table VI: Controlling for value, size, and momentum 
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio abnormal returns. We report average characteristics adjusted returns and 
Fama and French (1993) alphas. Characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw monthly returns minus the returns 
on an equally weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, market-book, and one year momentum quintile. 
Three factor alphas are defined as the intercept in a regression of the monthly excess return of the Treasury bill rate 
on the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolios. Returns and alphas are in monthly 
percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates. 
 
  Characteristic 
adjusted returns 
Fama-French 
3 factor alpha 
  Q1  Q5  L/S  Q1  Q5  L/S 
Equal weight 
Three month flow  0.02  0.17  0.15  -0.18  0.14  0.32 
  (0.28)  (3.07)  (1.88)  (1.18)  (1.67)  (1.81) 
             
Six month flow  0.05  0.08  0.03  -0.16  0.05  0.21 
  (0.91)  (1.57)  (0.40)  (1.13)  (0.54)  (1.20) 
             
One year flow  0.03  0.07  0.04  -0.13  0.00  0.14 
  (0.54)  (1.20)  (0.45)  (1.01)  (0.01)  (0.79) 
             
Three year flow  0.14  -0.08  -0.22  0.16  -0.29  -0.45 
  (2.56)  (1.26)  (2.49)  (1.35)  (2.13)  (2.95) 
             
Five year flow  0.12  -0.03  -0.15  0.10  -0.16  -0.26 
  (2.15)  (0.49)  (1.88)  (0.90)  (1.25)  (2.31) 
Value weight 
Three month flow  -0.02  -0.02  0.01  -0.20  0.15  0.35 
  (0.33)  (0.20)  (0.08)  (1.64)  (1.20)  (1.61) 
             
Six month flow  0.02  -0.14  -0.16  -0.16  0.01  0.17 
  (0.24)  (1.82)  (1.31)  (1.25)  (0.09)  (0.77) 
             
One year flow  -0.01  -0.13  -0.12  -0.10  -0.11  -0.01 
  (0.10)  (1.47)  (0.89)  (0.82)  (0.80)  (0.05) 
             
Three year flow  0.13  -0.26  -0.39  0.18  -0.35  -0.53 
  (1.50)  (2.51)  (2.76)  (1.50)  (2.73)  (2.59) 
             
Five year flow  0.12  -0.18  -0.30  0.14  -0.24  -0.38 
  (1.34)  (1.99)  (2.06)  (1.31)  (1.79)  (1.97) 
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Table VII: 3 year flows vs. value 
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio returns. At the beginning of every calendar month 
stocks are ranked in ascending order based on the last available flow and market-book ratio 
(M/B). M/B is market-book ratio (market value of equity divided by Compustat book value of 
equity).  The timing of M/B follows Fama and French (1993) and is as of the previous December 
year-end. Stocks are assigned to one of twenty-five portfolios. L/S is a zero cost portfolio that 
holds the top 20% stocks and sells short the bottom 20% stocks.  Portfolios are rebalanced 
monthly to maintain equal or value weights.  We report average returns in excess of the Treasury 
bill rate. Returns are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates. 
 
    Low 
Flow        High 
Flow 
High flow 
Minus Low flow 
    Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  L/S 
Equal weight 
Value   Q1  1.29  1.42  1.38  1.07  1.04  -0.25 
    (3.80)  (3.84)  (3.57)  (2.97)  (2.99)  (1.46) 
  Q2  1.17  1.17  1.20  1.05  0.85  -0.32 
    (3.82)  (3.85)  (3.76)  (3.36)  (2.62)  (2.22) 
  Q3  1.05  1.14  0.95  0.84  0.75  -0.30 
    (3.11)  (3.54)  (2.87)  (2.45)  (2.00)  (2.07) 
  Q4  0.77  0.84  0.57  0.61  0.47  -0.30 
    (2.06)  (2.27)  (1.38)  (1.51)  (1.10)  (1.92) 
Growth   Q5  0.55  0.59  0.08  0.07  0.01  -0.54 
    (1.22)  (1.25)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.03)  (2.34) 
               
Growth minus   L/S  -0.68  -0.76  -1.21  -0.91  -0.95   
Value    (2.55)  (2.70)  (4.16)  (2.77)  (3.08)   
Value weight 
Value   Q1  0.92  1.14  0.98  0.67  0.96  0.04 
    (2.77)  (3.59)  (2.98)  (2.13)  (2.86)  (0.16) 
  Q2  0.79  0.79  0.85  0.81  0.59  -0.20 
    (2.59)  (2.77)  (2.76)  (2.79)  (1.90)  (0.99) 
  Q3  0.98  0.89  0.92  0.64  0.61  -0.37 
    (3.00)  (3.18)  (3.15)  (1.98)  (1.72)  (1.88) 
  Q4  0.78  0.85  0.84  0.59  0.24  -0.54 
    (2.31)  (2.85)  (2.68)  (1.74)  (0.59)  (2.36) 
Growth   Q5  0.91  0.87  0.58  0.23  0.16  -0.75 
    (2.37)  (2.62)  (1.64)  (0.57)  (0.32)  (2.68) 
               
Growth minus  L/S  -0.01  -0.25  -0.37  -0.41  -0.74   
Value    (0.02)  (0.89)  (1.20)  (1.44)  (2.26)   Dumb money – Page 53 
 
Table VIII: 3 year flows vs. reversals 
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio returns. At the beginning of every calendar month 
stocks are ranked in ascending order based on the last available flow and lagged three year 
returns.  The returns have been lagged 12 months. Stocks are assigned to one of twenty-five 
portfolios. L/S is a zero cost portfolio that holds the top 20% stocks and sells short the bottom 
20% stocks.  Portfolios are rebalanced monthly to maintain equal or value weights.  We report 
average returns in excess of the Treasury bill rate. Returns are in monthly percent, t-statistics are 
shown below the coefficient estimates. 
 
 
  Low 





    Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  L/S 
Equal weight 
Losers  Q1  1.64  1.46  1.47  1.52  1.17  -0.47 
    (3.26)  (2.65)  (2.30)  (2.56)  (2.23)  (1.55) 
  Q2  1.04  1.09  0.99  0.80  0.99  -0.05 
    (2.98)  (2.99)  (2.48)  (2.05)  (2.60)  (0.29) 
  Q3  0.99  1.07  0.94  0.95  0.72  -0.27 
    (3.38)  (3.82)  (3.30)  (2.99)  (2.20)  (1.89) 
  Q4  0.88  1.04  0.65  0.78  0.60  -0.28 
    (2.93)  (3.72)  (2.39)  (2.72)  (1.85)  (2.07) 
Winners   Q5  0.77  0.53  0.47  0.48  0.18  -0.59 
    (2.04)  (1.52)  (1.23)  (1.29)  (0.43)  (3.23) 
               
Losers minus   L/S  -0.80  -0.86  -0.93  -0.96  -0.91   
Winners    (2.46)  (2.29)  (2.04)  (2.52)  (2.94)   
Value weight 
Losers  Q1  1.53  1.25  1.06  1.19  1.18  -0.34 
    (3.52)  (2.47)  (1.88)  (2.26)  (2.23)  (0.85) 
  Q2  1.15  1.18  0.96  0.89  1.12  -0.03 
    (3.20)  (3.46)  (2.53)  (2.39)  (2.85)  (0.10) 
  Q3  0.99  1.15  1.14  0.68  0.74  -0.26 
    (3.22)  (4.04)  (3.55)  (2.20)  (2.22)  (1.30) 
  Q4  0.85  0.76  0.83  0.71  0.59  -0.26 
    (2.78)  (2.83)  (2.99)  (2.59)  (1.79)  (1.33) 
Winners   Q5  0.81  0.80  0.66  0.53  0.23  -0.58 
    (2.26)  (2.39)  (1.97)  (1.42)  (0.52)  (2.27) 
               
Losers minus   L/S  -0.66  -0.41  -0.36  -0.61  -0.88   
Winners    (2.26)  (1.04)  (0.74)  (1.54)  (2.36)   
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Table IX: Mutual fund returns 
 
This table shows calendar time portfolio returns. At the beginning of every calendar month mutual funds are ranked 
in ascending order based on the last available difference between then actual  x  and counterfactual weight  x ˆ  in the 
aggregate mutual fund sector.  x  is the fund’s actual percent of dollar value of the total mutual fund universe in the 
sample. x ˆ  is counterfactual percent, using a horizon between three months and  five years. Funds are assigned to one 
of five portfolios. Portfolios are rebalanced monthly to maintain equal or value weights. Value weights are compute 
using net asset values. When sorting funds on raw flows, we use the total dollar flow over different horizons divided 
by the net asset value of the fund at the beginning of the period. This table includes all available equity funds in the 
CRSP mutual fund database over the period 1980 – 2003. We report average returns in excess of the Treasury bill 
rate and Fama and French (1993) alphas. Alphas are defined as the intercept in a regression of the monthly excess 
return of the Treasury bill rate on the monthly returns from Fama and French (1993) mimicking portfolio. Returns 
and alphas are in monthly percent, t-statistics are shown below the coefficient estimates.   
 
  Sorted on  x x ˆ -   Sorted 
On raw flows 
  Excess returns  Fama-French 





  Q1  Q5  L/S  Q1  Q5  L/S  L/S  L/S 
Equal weight 
Three month flow  0.49  0.62  0.13  -0.16  0.03  0.19  0.13  0.19 
  (1.52)  (2.32)  (1.68)  (-2.54)  (0.65)  (2.74)  (1.69)  (2.85) 
Six month flow  0.46  0.55  0.09  -0.17  -0.01  0.16  0.08  0.16 
  (1.71)  (1.97)  (1.18)  (-2.71)  (-0.16)  (2.37)  (1.14)  (2.41) 
One year flow  0.48  0.52  0.03  -0.15  -0.03  0.11  0.04  0.11 
  (1.79)  (1.82)  (0.46)  (-2.48)  (-0.69)  (1.68)  (0.49)  (1.75) 
Three year flow  0.55  0.40  -0.15  -0.09  -0.19  -0.10  -0.15  -0.10 
  (1.94)  (1.39)  (-2.14)  (-1.67)  (-3.69)  (-1.43)  (-2.35)  (-1.62) 
Five year flow  0.57  0.51  -0.06  -0.11  -0.14  -0.03  -0.07  -0.03 
  (1.91)  (1.68)  (-1.16)  (-2.02)  (-2.81)  (-0.53)  (-1.31)  (-0.54) 
Value weight 
Three month flow  0.41  0.71  0.25  -0.20  0.15  0.35  0.24  0.35 
  (1.52)  (2.32)  (1.68)  (-2.76)  (1.79)  (2.93)  (1.69)  (3.00) 
Six month flow  0.43  0.59  0.12  -0.18  0.09  0.26  0.13  0.27 
  (1.62)  (1.93)  (0.87)  (-2.66)  (1.01)  (2.34)  (0.93)  (2.49) 
One year flow  0.54  0.43  -0.11  -0.10  -0.02  0.05  -0.17  0.00 
  (2.01)  (1.42)  (-0.78)  (-1.37)  (-0.28)  (0.44)  (-1.19)  (0.02) 
Three year flow  0.68  0.37  -0.32  0.05  -0.21  -0.30  -0.29  -0.24 
  (2.35)  (1.20)  (-2.93)  (0.63)  (-3.26)  (-2.78)  (-2.70)  (-2.39) 
Five year flow  0.74  0.49  -0.19  0.02  -0.12  -0.14  -0.18  -0.11 




Table X: Economic significance of three year flows for the aggregate mutual fund investor 
 
This table shows the property of monthly calendar time portfolio returns.  It uses three year flows.   
R
ACTUAL is returns on a mimicking portfolio for the entire mutual fund sector, with portfolio 
weights the same as the actual weights of the aggregate mutual fund sector.  R
NOFLOW is returns on 
a mimicking portfolio for the counterfactual mutual fund sector, with portfolio weights the same 
as the counterfactual weights of the aggregate mutual fund sector.  
M R  is the CRSP value 
weighted market return.  
 
 
    Mean  t-stat  SR 
Using stock returns 
Actual excess return on mutual fund holdings  R
ACTUAL – R
F  0.68  2.16  0.137 
         
Counterfactual excess return  R
NOFLOW – R
F  0.73  2.35  0.149 
      on mutual fund holdings         
Market excess returns  R
M – R
F  0.65  2.26  0.143 
         
Net benefit of mutual funds  R
ACTUAL – R
M  0.03  0.68  0.043 
         
Dumb money effect  R
ACTUAL – R
NOFLOW  -0.05  2.66  -0.169 
         
Stock picking  R
NOFLOW – R
M  0.08  1.80  0.114 
         
Using mutual fund returns 
Actual excess return on mutual funds  R
ACTUAL – R
F  0.51  1.83  0.116 
          
Counterfactual excess returns  R
NOFLOW – R
F  0.56  2.03  0.129 
      on mutual funds           
         
Net benefit of mutual funds  R
ACTUAL – R
M  -0.12  3.34  -0.213 
         
Dumb money effect  R
ACTUAL – R
NOFLOW  -0.05  2.64  -0.168 
         
Stock picking  R
NOFLOW – R
M  -0.07  2.06  -0.132 
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Table XI: Robustness tests for economic significance of flows  
 
This table shows the property of monthly calendar time portfolio returns for different horizons, 
using stock returns.   R
ACTUAL is returns on a mimicking portfolio for the entire mutual fund 
sector, with portfolio weights the same as the actual weights of the aggregate mutual fund sector.  
R
NOFLOW is returns on a mimicking portfolio for the counterfactual mutual fund sector, with 
portfolio weights the same as the counterfactual weights of the aggregate mutual fund sector.  R
M 
is the CRSP value weighted market return.  
 











     
Three month flow  -0.11  0.04 
  (1.18)  (0.89) 
     
Six month flow  -0.12  0.04 
  (1.21)  (0.96) 
     
One year flow  -0.13  0.06 
  (1.34)  (1.28) 
     
Three year flow  -0.05  0.08 
  (2.66)  (1.80) 
     
Five year flow  -0.05  0.10 
  (2.21)  (2.23) 
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Table XII: Issuance 
 
This table shows issuance activity between January and December of year  1 + t , for portfolios of 
firms sorted on 3-year flows as of December in year t. In December stocks are ranked in 
ascending order based on the last available 3 year flow. Stocks are assigned to one of five 
portfolios. Portfolios are rebalanced every year to maintain equal or value weights. Issuance is 
defined as 1 minus the firm’s ratio of the number of shares outstanding one year ago to the 
number of shares outstanding today.  Issuance is in percent, t-statistics are shown below the 
coefficient estimates. Characteristic-adjusted issuance is defined as raw issuance minus the 
average issuance on an equally weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms with non-missing flows in 
the same size, market-book, and one year momentum quintile. 
 
  Low 
flow 





  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5   
Equal weighted  2.66  2.95  3.15  2.83  3.64  0.98 
  (11.21)  (6.85)  (8.08)  (8.89)  (9.88)  (3.55) 
             
Value weighted  3.18  1.94  2.11  2.64  4.98  1.80 
  (6.08)  (4.11)  (3.74)  (8.39)  (9.70)  (2.47) 
             
Equal weighted, trimmed issuance  2.79  3.04  3.40  2.95  3.73  0.94 
  (12.65)  (7.27)  (8.69)  (9.46)  (10.64)  (3.51) 
             
Equal weighted, 1981-1993  2.38  1.55  1.87  2.07  2.85  0.47 
  (7.24)  (3.26)  (4.82)  (4.22)  (5.83)  (2.29) 
             
Equal weighted, 1994-2004  2.93  4.36  4.42  3.59  4.43  1.50 
  (8.76)  (12.56)  (12.26)  (14.82)  (10.03)  (3.17) 
             
Characteristic adjusted issuance,  -0.33  -0.10   0.07  -0.20   0.58  0.90 
equal weighted  (1.97)  (0.53)  (0.55)  (1.80)  (4.30)  (4.69) 
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Table A.1: Hypothetic example showing counterfactual calculation 
 
  Year  1980  1981  1982  1983  1985 
             
ACTUAL DATA FOR INDIVIDUAL FUNDS 
             
   Returns  Fund 1  10%  10%  5%  10%  5% 
  Fund 2  -5%  10%  -10%     
  Fund 3      10%  10%  5% 
             
   NAV  Fund 1  100  160  268  395  515 
  Fund 2  50  105  144  0  0 
  Fund 3    50  45  100  154 
             
   FLOWS  Fund 1    50  100  100  100 
  Fund 2    50  50  -144  0 
  Fund 3    50  -10  50  50 
ACTUAL DATA FOR AGGREGATES 
             
   NAV  Agg.  150  315  457  494  669 
   FLOW  Agg.  0  150  140  6  150 
             
   NAV, last year, of funds existing this year  Agg.    150  315  313  494 
   FLOW of non-dying funds  Agg.    150  140  150  150 
             
COUNTERFACTUAL DATA 
             
   NAV  Fund 1  100  210  292  449  591 
  Fund 2  50  105  141  0  0 
  Fund 3      22  46  79 
             
   FLOWS  Fund 1    100  71  128  120 
  Fund 2    50  47  -141  0 
  Fund 3      22  22  30 
             
 
 
  
 